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Political economy scholars have criticised the Baltic countries’ transition to capitalism as socially 
‘disembedded’ and exposed to a zealous form of neoliberalism. Relying on the traditional definition of the 
welfare state, i.e. solely focusing on cash compensation of the losers of transition, these accounts have failed 
to recognise the Baltic countries’ re-orientation towards social investment. This article argues that the Baltic 
welfare states have experienced a more complex post-socialist transformation than suggested by the 
neoliberal retrenchment narrative. To that end, it uncovers high investment in education, comparatively 
generous labour market policies and an expansion of public sector employment. 
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Beyond neoliberalism? Revisiting the welfare state in the Baltic 
Political economy scholars have criticised the Baltic countries’ transition to capitalism as socially 
‘disembedded’ and exposed to a zealous form of neoliberalism. Relying on the traditional 
definition of the welfare state, i.e. solely focusing on cash compensation of the losers of transition, 
these accounts have failed to recognise the Baltic countries’ re-orientation towards social 
investment. This article argues that the Baltic welfare states have experienced a more complex 
post-socialist transformation than suggested by the neoliberal retrenchment narrative. To that end, 
it uncovers high investment in education, comparatively generous labour market policies and an 
expansion of public sector employment. 
 
Introduction 
Transition from socialism to capitalism in Eastern Europe was described as the ‘great economic experiment of 
the 20th century’ (Stiglitz 1999, p. 3). It was also likened to ‘rebuilding the ship at sea’ (Elster et al. 1998), due 
to the unprecedented economic restructuring and institutional reforms that were taking place at the same time. In 
the early 1990s, Eastern European countries faced the colossal tasks of privatising their state-owned enterprises, 
introducing property rights and tax systems, and establishing democratic political competition, while also 
having to find a way to attract private capital and jumpstart their economies from the initial recessions that they 
confronted following the collapse of socialism. Following the demise of collective ownership of production 
inputs, new social contracts had to be established which would determine the dynamics of redistribution 
between workers, owners of capital and the state in these emerging capitalist economies.  
Since these institutional and economic reforms were shaped through interactions between transnational capital, 
international epistemic communities and domestic political actors (Orenstein et al. 2008), as well as the 
countries’ specific historical path dependencies and their demographic and geographic characteristics, different 
post-socialist economic and institutional structures emerged across the region. Comparative political economy 
literature has acknowledged a variance between the capitalist development trajectory pursued by the Baltic 
countries—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—on one hand, and the Visegrad countries—Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—on the other. The Visegrad countries have pursued economic growth by 
upgrading their industries towards higher value manufacturing products (Stockhammer et al. 2016). Instead, the 
smaller Baltic countries focused on rapid liberalisation to attract foreign capital into high value service sectors 
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such as banking, information and communication technology (ICT) and real estate (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). 
Both of these stylised1 trajectories have been characterised by high dependence on foreign capital and 
international markets in the context of integration with the European Union (EU) (Nölke and Vliegenthart 
2009), which has raised concerns over the sustainability of such externally dependent economic models, 
especially since the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
Policy and academic literature has stressed the Baltic countries’ neoliberal characteristics, their rapid 
and effective market liberalisation, macroeconomic stability, simplified tax systems as well as the reduction in 
total public spending (Aslund 2002, 2013). Comparative political economists also underlined their zealous 
pursuit of macroeconomic stability and economic openness, as well as was minimal state involvement in the 
functioning of the economy. Bohle and Greskovits (2007, 2012) identified the Baltic trajectory of economic 
reform as ‘disembedded neoliberalism’, characterised by minimal state efforts to establish new welfarist 
contracts and compensate their population for the redistributional losses that they endured due to the collapse of 
socialism. Literature has also juxtaposed such a trajectory of capitalist development to the more socially 
‘embedded’ form of neoliberalism that was implemented in Visegrad, and which was characterised by 
substantial cash compensation of the losers of transition via unemployment benefits and early retirement 
schemes (Bohle & Greskovits 2012; Vanhuysse 2006).  
This article revisits and challenges such an interpretation of the Baltic vs the Visegrad countries’ 
economic transitions and the respective welfarist contracts that emerged from them, by throwing light on those 
components of the Eastern European emerging welfare states which have not been examined in the above 
literature. To do this, it relies on the new generation of comparative welfare state research which focuses on 
social investment policies, such as state investment in education and training (e.g. see Morel et al. 2012), and 
the positive impact they have had on the reduction of social inequalities in the era of liberalisation (Thelen 
2014). The article shows that a social investment agenda has been implemented in the liberalising Baltic 
countries, following which it suggests a revision of the retrenchment narrative surrounding the Baltic welfare 
states. In other words, by showing that a lot more than a passive disintegration of the welfare state took place in 
the Baltic, the article challenges existing accounts of capitalist diversity in the region which are based on the 
traditional definition of the welfare state as solely the provider of passive social welfare programmes. 
                                                
1 We refer to them as stylised because they do not examine the differences between countries which are grouped 
within these broader regional classifications of capitalist development. 
 4 
Specifically, the article shows that educational expenditures, labour market policy and employment in 
the knowledge-intensive parts of the public sector, all of which have been associated with social investment in 
the literature, have been generally more extensive in the Baltic than in the Visegrad states. Based on this 
empirical evidence, the article then argues that post-socialist welfare state development in the Baltic has been 
characterised by a more complex set of reforms than simple retrenchment, and a re-orientation towards social 
investment.  
Since the article takes a comparative approach to analysis within the context of Eastern Europe, this 
trajectory of post-socialist welfare state development in the Baltic is juxtaposed to the one found in Visegrad. 
The article is exclusively interested in this intra-regional comparison between the Baltic and the Visegrad 
countries because these countries are at similar levels of economic development, which allows us to uncover the 
policy and spending patterns that are not visible in the more frequently encountered comparisons between 
Eastern Europe and the more developed western European economies, where the focus is on whether the 
Eastern countries are catching up with the core of the EU. 
Furthermore, while we acknowledge that the three Baltic countries have smaller populations than the 
Visegrad countries,2 as well as somewhat different historical legacies (they were part of the Soviet Union) and 
geographies (their proximity to the Nordic countries), the starting assumption of this article, which is the 
common approach in comparative political economy, is that economic policy and politics since the early 1990s 
have also shaped Eastern European capitalist growth models and welfare states and that socialist legacies and 
the countries’ geographies alone cannot entirely explain these countries’ welfare state developments since the 
onset of transition. 
Finally, by showing that social investment oriented social policies have been more developed in the 
Baltic than in Visegrad countries, the article also expands the comparative welfare state literature on Eastern 
Europe and aligns it with the ongoing debates on welfare state developments in western Europe which focus on 
social investment and its role in underpinning knowledge-based competitiveness in the era of ICT-led growth. 
Arguments presented in this article thus also revisit the existing political economy narrative that the Baltic 
countries’ approach to organising the economy and stimulating growth has simply been based on services 
                                                
2 Estonia has 1.3mn inhabitants, Latvia 1.9mn, and Lithuania 2.9mn. On the other hand, Slovaka is the smallest 
in the Visegrad group, with 5mn inhabitants, Hungary and the Czech Republic have 9mn and 10mn 
respectively, and Poland is by far the largest with 38mn inhabitants.  
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liberalisation and credit expansion, and point out that educational investment, relative flexicurity in the labour 
market and digitalisation have also been important components of the competitiveness agenda in the region, and 
most notably in Estonia. 
The article adheres to the following structure. The next section discusses the existing literature on the 
changing role of the welfare state in the era of ICT- and knowledge-intensive growth and literature on capitalist 
diversity in Eastern Europe. The key argument is then presented. Section 3 shows statistical indicators on R&D 
expenditures, educational policy, labour market policy and public sector employment in the Baltic and Visegrad 
spanning from the 1990s to the second decade of the 21st century, and supplements it with some primary 
sources, such as government documents and reports. The final section summarises the article’s contribution and 
its theoretical and empirical implications.  
 
Literature review and argument 
Inspired by a new generation of social policy literature which focuses on new social risks, the argument put 
forward in this article revisits the political economy account on post-socialist welfare state reform in the Baltic, 
which is currently based on the traditional definition of the welfare state. The traditional social policy view is 
that European welfare states have been shrinking and disappearing over the past few decades (Allan and 
Scruggs 2004; Pierson 2006), driven by neoliberalism that reduces the state to regulation as the main 
instrument of economic governance (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). More recent scholarship has, however, 
challenged this perspective (Fougner 2006; Hemerijck 2012; Jenson 2010; Morel et al. 2012), by arguing that 
European welfare states have in fact been adapting to new economic circumstances and new social risks which 
have emerged in response to the changes in demographic, family and labour market structures, as well as 
growing fiscal pressures.  
These emerging trends have generated a scholarly interest in the so-called social investment policies 
which focus on creating and enhancing the human capital of the population to support the expansion of the 
knowledge-intensive economy as a key vehicle of modern era growth (Morel et al. 2012). These focus on the 
reduction of labour market vulnerability of individuals through investment in their human capital from early 
childhood through life rather than via passive social insurance of adults. The logic of social investment is to 
subsidise disadvantaged citizens to improve their marginal productivity, so that they can access higher wages 
and better quality jobs. It is a very different approach to managing an economy from a laissez-faire one which 
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sees the state as a regulator only. In that context, Jensen (2008, p. 160) argues that education should be 
considered part of the welfare state and that its absence from the literature and welfare state measurements 
may be more a matter of convention than anything else. Furthermore, efforts to expand the definition of the 
welfare state beyond social transfers and also focus on social services have been rife in the more recent 
literature (see Schelkle 2012 for an overview).  
This reconceptualisation of the welfare state has also had consequences for how political economy 
scholars view the role of social policies in economic development. Social investment policies have been 
theoretically and empirically associated with the so-called knowledge economy and knowledge-based 
competitiveness. Over the past 20-30 years, deindustrialisation and expansion of the service economy have 
come hand in hand with the onset of the so-called digital era and proliferation of information and 
communication technology (ICT) as an important input for growth. These multifaceted changes in economic 
structure across the developed market economies have updated economists’ beliefs about the nature of the 
service economy and its implications for jobs and growth in the following fashion, which has had an important 
influence on policy makers. Namely, standard economic theory suggests that services are less productive than 
manufacturing, and that wages in the service economy are necessarily lower than wages in manufacturing. This 
is because a traditional service worker cannot service more than one client at once without decreasing the 
overall quality of their work, while technological progress in industry can substantially increase a worker’s 
output and thus their wages. Emergence of the ICT and knowledge-based economic model has changed this 
traditional perspective on the potential of the service economy. A new narrative has emerged around these new 
developments that growing educational attainment, along with an increase in digitalisation and flexibility of the 
workplace, can substantially increase the productivity of service work, and thus lead to better quality jobs and 
higher wages across a wide range of service sectors which benefit from these technological and institutional 
innovations. This is the logic that underlines the influential concept of knowledge-based growth in the digital 
era, which has been strongly advocated by intergovernmental organisations such as the European Commission 
(EC) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) over the past two decades, and 
which goes beyond the IT sector and emphasises the economy-wide productivity enhancing role of new 
technologies. 
So what adaptations has the welfare state experienced along with the emergence of the idea of 
knowledge-based competitiveness? Instead of assuming that the role of the welfare state is to protect the 
population from market forces through cash benefits that smooth their income in times of need, there has been 
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a growing interest in understanding how welfare state reforms are used to support countries’ knowledge-
intensive growth trajectories (Hassel and Palier fcm; Morel et al. 2012). Given the emergence of the ‘new’ 
ICT-driven and knowledge-based service economy, tapping into the knowledge and skills of the workforce has 
been recognised as a key driver of economic growth and development across the European Union (EU) and 
beyond. Public investment into human capital has thus become a key welfare state input for the knowledge-
intensive growth model. Thelen (2014), most notably, has shown that liberalisation in some countries, most 
notably in Scandinavia and in the Netherlands, has gone hand in hand with social investment policies delivered 
by the state, which has led to a collectivisation of new social risks and provided a cushion against increasing 
flexibilisation of the labour force. She differentiates such a liberalisation trajectory from the one pursued by 
the United States and United Kingdom, which has been characterised by deregulation and has led to 
individualisation of risk. Nelson and Stephens (2012) have shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom about 
liberalisation, substantial public sector investment is needed to support growth of high productivity service 
jobs. 
Social investment can therefore be viewed as a political strategy that transforms the current 
distributional conflict over cash resources in the era of liberalisation and knowledge-intensive growth into a 
future-oriented welfare for all through equitable production, mobilisation and maintenance of human capital. 
In other words, instead of looking at social investment only as a supply side intervention, it can also be seen as 
an alternative perspective on redistribution, or a government strategy for strengthening the negotiating position 
of labour vis-à-vis capital by providing them with more education, which then feeds into higher productivity, 
higher wages, better living standards and economic growth (Midgley 1999). 
This new generation of political economy and social policy research that focuses on knowledge-based 
competitiveness and social investment has not yet made significant inroads into political economy scholarship 
on Eastern Europe. In an initial attempt to analyse capitalist diversity in Eastern Europe, Feldmann (2006) 
classified Estonia as a liberal market economy (LME), without making specific reference to the fact that such 
economies are considered internationally competitive in high-end services, ICT and other sectors that rely on 
radical innovation and changing market conditions (Hall and Soskice 2001). Bohle and Greskovits (2012) have 
argued that the Baltic countries have pursued market liberalisation and deregulation, which has resulted in a 
high level of individualisation of social risks and social disembeddeness (also see Vanhuysse 2009). They 
briefly mention these countries’ substantial investment into education, ICT and reduction of new social risks, 
but do not develop the argument further. Finally, they argue that such rapid liberalisation of the Baltic 
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economies was possible due to little political pressure to compensate losers of transition and that the Baltic 
neoliberal model was feasible because of these countries’ emphasis on identity politics of nation building and 
alienation from the Soviet Union, which resulted in high social tolerance for inequality. According to them, the 
perceived threat of Russia united the people politically and made it feasible to impose a high economic and 
social cost on the population. They go on to conclude that, because of this high social tolerance for inequality, 
the Baltic countries could focus on economic growth only, rather than also on redistribution and monetary 
compensation of the losers of transition. 
On the other hand, micro studies and country case studies, most of which focus on Estonia, indicate 
that ICT and education have played an important role in the Baltic growth model. Lumiste et al. (2007) 
recognise the key role that investment in ICT has played in the stellar economic performance of Estonia, not 
only in the IT sector but more widely, through its overall impact on productivity. Runnel et al. (2009) amply 
discuss the country’s strategic plan to develop into a modern ICT-intensive service economy. Estonia’s 
achievements have also been hailed as outstanding by international media. ‘When Estonia regained its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, less than half of its population had a phone and its only 
independent link to the outside world was a Finnish mobile phone concealed in the foreign minister’s garden. 
Two decades later, it is a world leader in technology’ (The Economist 2013). In OECD’s 2015 Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), Estonian 15 year olds were ranked third in the world by educational 
attainment, after Singapore and Japan (The Economist 2016). 
Furthermore, in the introduction to the special issue of Social Policy and Administration which 
compares the Baltic and Nordic welfare states, Greve (2017) explains that the two neighbouring regions have 
some similarities vis-à-vis the social investment orientation of their social policies, while in other aspects, the 
Baltic states have gone down the Anglo-Saxon deregulation route. He further points out that this assessment 
depends on the specific policies that are being examined and that there is also variation both within the Baltic as 
well as within the Nordic states. This special issue, however, does not compare the Baltic countries to the 
Visegrad ones, which is the approach taken in this article. In other words, this article acknowledges that the 
Baltic welfare states are not at the level of the much more developed Nordic countries, but also argues that they 
are shaping in that direction, in contrast to the Visegrad states, which are at the similar levels of economic 
development and where absence of social investment policies is much more pronounced.  
Finally, policy interest towards educational reform in the Baltic could have been further spurred by 
their nation-building efforts following the region’s secession from the Soviet Union, which would have 
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generated an initial political impetus towards educational and social investment-oriented reforms. This 
hypothesis stems from the literature such as  Gellner (1983), who has argued that nation-building and 
educational policy have historically been ‘bedfellows’. There is also the theory of ‘education as compensatory 
legitimation’ model originally developed by Offe (1976) and Weiler (1983), where ‘educational reforms are a 
mechanism of state policies aimed at legitimating the state’s authority in a conflicted civil society’ (Khavenson 
& Carnoy 2016, p.180). 
These various literature strands offer substantial indications that social investment policies would have 
been implemented in the Baltic, at least to a greater extent than this has been the case in Visegrad countries, and 
motivate the next section of this article, which provides an empirical assessment of welfare state trends in the 
region.   
 
Empirical analysis 
This section starts with a brief assessment of the extent to which the ICT-intensive and knowledge-based model 
of competitiveness has been pursued by the Baltic countries in comparison to their Visegrad neighbours, which 
have been at similar levels of economic development. The assessment is based on indicators related to research 
and development (R&D) expenditures, employment in knowledge-intensive services, and digital literacy. The 
intention of the section is not, however, to provide a comprehensive overview of the Eastern European capitalist 
models of growth, but to motivate a further exploration of our suggestion that there may be more to the Baltic 
welfare states than is suggested by current political economy scholarship. 
Following this overview, and in line with empirical studies on social investment policies from social 
policy and comparative political economy literature (see Morel et al. 2012 for an overview), the section goes on 
to compare education policy, labour market policy and public sector employment trends between the Baltic and 
Visegrad countries over the past two decades. While some of the literature also associates work-family 
reconciliation policies such as childcare with social investment (Morgan 2012, Nelson and Stephens 2012), this 
article does not examine these policies since formal childcare provision has not become a politically salient 
topic in Eastern Europe until very recently. Following the comparative political economy approaches advocated 
by Shalev (2007) and Collier (2011), these policies are analysed using country level statistical indicators, which 
are supplemented by primary literature sources, such as governmental and intergovernmental country reports. 
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The data are obtained from Eurostat, OECD, the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED), the 
Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) and the ICTWSS database (Viser, 2016).  
 
R&D, knowledge-intensive employment and digital literacy 
While R&D expenditures as a share of total government spending throughout Eastern Europe have expectedly 
lagged behind the more developed western market economies, Figure 1 (left panel) indicates their variation 
within the region. Since 1995, which is the first available data year, R&D expenditures across the seven 
countries have been the highest in Estonia followed by Lithuania, as well as the Czech Republic (which has 
generally been at a higher level of economic development than the rest of the region). While the upward trend 
has continued in Estonia and the Czech Republic since the 2008 crisis, it has reversed in Lithuania, where the 
impact of the crisis was more severe. Latvia, on the other hand, has lagged behind all seven Eastern European 
countries throughout the period of observation (Figure 1, left panel). A very similar pattern can be observed 
when R&D expenditures as a share of government spending are replaced by R&D expenditures as a share of 
GDP. It is also worthwhile to note that the higher growth rates in the Baltic countries than in Visegrad during 
the 2000s imply that these R&D allocations in Estonia, followed by Lithuania, were even more substantial 
than these indicators show.  
A similar picture emerges when we look at R&D personnel as a share of total employment (Figure 1, 
right panel), with Estonia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic as regional leaders. Also, in contrast to the trend 
seen for R&D expenditures, the share of R&D personnel in total employment has not dropped in Lithuania 
following the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, possibly because the country also experienced a temporary fall 
in employment in other sectors. Latvia has seen an increase in R&D personnel over time, and it has been at the 
level of Slovakia throughout the period of observation, while Poland has fared the worst among the seven 
countries (Figure 1, right panel).  
< Figure 1 about here > 
Figure 2 (left panel) shows knowledge-intensive service employment as a share of total working age 
population in the Baltic and Visegrad countries. According to Eurostat, an activity is classified as knowledge 
intensive if more than 33 per cent of employees in that activity have tertiary education. Therefore, it is important 
to note that knowledge-intensive employment is not considered as exclusively located in the IT sector, but in 
every sector, including parts of the public (administration, health and education), where there is a critical mass 
 11 
of knowledge and digital technologies that can boost the productivity of the workforce. According to Figure 2 
(left panel), knowledge-intensive employment in the Baltic, and particularly in Estonia, exceeds that found in 
the Visegrad countries. While proving a causal relationship between policy inputs and labour market outcomes 
would require a more rigorous empirical analysis, this descriptive trend indicates that the service economy in the 
Baltic is more dynamic and knowledge-based than in Visegrad. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
The level of digital literacy, proxied by internet usage skills,3 is also higher in the Baltic than in 
Visegrad countries (Figure 2, right panel). Furthermore, according to The Web Index, Estonia is ranked very 
highly in a number of dimensions of the Internet’s contribution to social, economic and political progress in 
countries across the world.4 For example, in terms of the Access and affordability of the Internet component of 
the Index (which includes indicators such as access to internet in schools, cost of broadband per capita income 
and policies promoting free and low cost internet access), Estonia ranked third in Europe and Central Asia in 
2014, right behind Denmark and Finland. While Lithuania and Latvia are not included in this survey,5 the Czech 
Republic was in the 17th place, followed by Hungary which was in the 18th and Poland in the 22nd. In terms of 
the Education and awareness component of the index, Estonia was also ranked third, after Iceland and 
Denmark, while Visegrad countries lagged substantially.  
Estonia also ranked higher than Latvia and Lithuania in terms of its educational and ICT infrastructure 
already during the early 2000s, as well as its high-technology exports. Latvia appears to have been slightly more 
advanced than Lithuania in terms of hi-tech exports, but weaker in communication technology and R&D efforts 
(World Bank 2003, p. 8). Lithuania has also continued its progress in communication technology, and by 2013 
the country was ranked 8th in the EU according to usage of electronic government services (KPMG 2014). Less 
information is available on the role of ICT and innovation in the Latvian and the Lithuanian growth models than 
                                                
3 Individuals with proficient internet usage skills can complete 5 or 6 of the following activities: used 
search engine, sent mail with attachment, posted messages to chatrooms/newsgroups or online discussion 
forum, made phone calls, done peer-to-peer file sharing or created a web page. 
4 This index is produced by the World Wide Web Foundation and it is the world’s first measure of its 
contribution to social, economic and political progress at country level. 
5 While this index does not include Lithuania and Latvia, other sources indicate that these two countries, 
although lagging after Estonia, are aspiring European leaders in ICT. 
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on the Estonian one, which is likely the case because Estonia has become an internationally recognised 
emerging leader in this field, while the two other Baltic states have not adopted this knowledge-based model of 
competitiveness and growth to the same extent. Nevertheless, the indicators presented in this section offer 
enough anecdotal evidence on the Baltic countries’ generally greater commitment to ICT-led economic growth 
than Visegrad’s, which motivates us to examine the nature of welfare state reform in the region and assess to 
what extent it has been adjusted to the needs of this ‘new’ economy.  
 
Education policy 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 led to structural changes in the educational systems of the 
newly independent Baltic states. OECD reviews of national education policies during the 1990s show that all 
three Baltic countries started the process of vigorous and all-encompassing education reforms which shared 
similar concepts and principles (OECD 2002: 15). The countries differed in terms of the sequence of 
implementation of educational reforms, but they nevertheless shared many similarities. All three also saw 
unprecedented grassroots engagement of educators and drastic increases in tertiary educational enrolment 
numbers already during the early stages of transition (OECD 2001a, 2001b, 2002). 
Apart from the many legislative changes which served to reform the higher education curricula, 
strengthen the research infrastructure and create more flexible degree programmes, the Baltic countries’ 
educational reforms were also characterised by strategic thinking about how education could strengthen their 
position in the global economy. The reform of the educational system towards a ‘technological revolution’ also 
had an additional aim to revitalise democracy and bring citizens closer to the state which was rebranding itself 
as efficient and modern (Runnel et al. 2009). Using a range of indicators to measure the types of skills that 
characterise educational systems in Eastern Europe, Martinaitis (2010, pp. 89-91) shows a stronger orientation 
towards general skills in all three Baltic countries in comparison to the Visegrad ones. Originating within the 
Varieties of Capitalism analytical framework, general skills are considered those which are transferable across 
firms, and even across sectors. They underpin high-end services, ICT and other sectors that rely on radical 
innovation and changing market conditions. Martinaitis (2010, pp. 82-3) also argues that the three Baltic 
countries paid much less attention than Visegrad countries to the development of vocational education and 
specific skills which are geared towards the manufacturing industry and are not easily transferable across 
sectors. This indicates their intention to reform their educational systems towards general skill regimes, and 
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thus make them more responsive to a liberal, services-oriented model of growth. 
General government expenditures on education as a share of GDP in the three Baltic countries have 
been significantly higher than educational expenditures in Visegrad countries, especially in comparison to the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia (Figure 3, left panel). Particularly Estonia has allocated substantial public funds to 
education, reaching up to 7 per cent of GDP in some years. This makes it one of the biggest spenders on 
education in the EU, as well as the OECD.6 Moreover, since the three Baltic countries had exceptionally high 
growth rates during the 2000s (and higher than those in Visegrad), their nominal allocations towards education 
would have been growing even during the periods which saw dropping shares of educational expenditures in 
GDP. 
< Figure 3	about here > 
Furthermore, Hungary and Poland, who have spent higher shares of their GDP on education than the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, especially during the mid-2000s, have not had such a clear focus of educational 
reform as the Baltic states, which were clearly committed to the establishment of general skill formation 
systems, as shown by Martinaitis (2010) using fuzzy set analysis. He further shows that Hungarian and Polish 
educational policy was neither entirely focused on the strengthening of manufacturing and specific skills nor on 
the development of the general ones (Martinaitis 2010).  
High expenditures on education in the Baltic states along with their overall smaller government size 
also demonstrate that educational spending has been a high political priority for their governments. In other 
words, education devours a significantly higher share of total public expenditures in the Baltic than in Visegrad 
countries. Overall public revenue/public spending as a share of GDP in 2002 was 36 per cent in Estonia, and 35 
per cent in Latvia and Lithuania, while it was 51 per cent and 45 per cent in Hungary and Poland respectively. 
Therefore, expenditures on education which amounted to 7 per cent of GDP in Estonia in 2002 constituted 20 
per cent of the country’s total public expenditures. In contrast, Hungary allocated 11 per cent of its total public 
expenditures to education in the same year (Figure 3, right panel).  
Furthermore, the Estonian government launched the Tiger Leap National Programme in 1997 with the 
aim to modernise the educational system, and create an inclusive learning environment that is more suited to 
the needs of  ‘a knowledge---based, information technology-intensive economy’ (OECD 2001a, p. 54). The 
                                                
6 EU-15 average spending on education is around 5 per cent of GDP.  
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programme equipped schools with ICT, linked them to the internet and offered ICT education and 
teaching/learning software to teachers. The country also established the Estonian Education Forum, a working 
group in charge of producing strategic documents on the country’s future education scenarios with the aim to 
inform education policy making (OECD 2001a, p. 54). Lithuania and especially Latvia, however, have lagged 
when it comes to investment in R&D and ICT as vehicles of growth.  
Moreover, all three Baltic countries boast of very high levels of tertiary educational attainment (Figure 
4). While a separate analysis would be needed to establish a causal relationship between expenditures on 
education and educational attainment, it is worthwhile noting that by the end of post-socialist transition, the 
Baltic countries had a substantially higher share of the population with tertiary education than Visegrad 
countries, which has been at even higher levels of economic development.7 In 2014, 32.6 per cent of the 
working age population had tertiary education in Estonia in comparison to 19.1 per cent in the Czech Republic 
(Figure 4). Latvia and Lithuania also stood out in terms of the higher educational attainment of their populations 
in comparison to Visegrad countries. While the earliest available Eurostat data on tertiary educational 
attainment shows that the Baltic countries were at higher levels than Visegrad countries already in the early 
2000s, Terama et al. (2014: 116) underline that enrolment in tertiary education in Estonia increased by 168 per 
cent between 1994/95 and 2005/2006, which constituted the highest growth rate in the OECD during that 
period.  
< Figure 4 about here > 
Investment in ICT in the region may have also spurred further demand for higher education. Skill-
biased technological change can, in theory, increase the demand for higher education because the 
complementarity between information technologies and skills can increase individuals’ returns to schooling 
(Castelló-Climent and Hidalgo-Cabrillana 2012). 
EU funds have also provided an additional stimulus for educational and innovation-oriented public 
investment in Eastern Europe. The EU began to heavily shape Eastern European growth models and EU co-
financing became an essential factor for the development of the region since the countries became members in 
2004. For the programmatic period 2007-2013, EU funds have represented 18.5 per cent of Estonia’s GDP, 
while they have represented 19.4 per cent and 19.6 per cent in Latvia and Lithuania respectively (versus 16.2 
per cent Eastern European average). Thus, the Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund and Horizon 2020 have 
                                                
7 Measured in terms of GDP per capita and GDP per capita PPP. 
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played an important role in promoting social investment in the region, both as part of the Lisbon Agenda, 
Europe 2020 and the 2013 Social Investment Package. Ever since 1993, member states have been determining 
the types of activities they spend the EU funds on. Therefore, allocation of funds and their structure reflect the 
countries’ individual economic strategies. In contrast to the other Eastern member states, many of the EU funds 
in Estonia have been channelled to the development of the knowledge-intensive economy, such as boosting 
international competitiveness of enterprises through research and development (R&D) investment and 
technology development. In Latvia and Lithuania the funds have been directed towards training of the 
unemployed and teachers, as well as increasing knowledge and competences of the workforce, thus indicating 
their strong orientation towards labour force activation (KPMG 2014), which is endemic to the social 
investment agenda.  
Finally, quality of education in Estonia, in particular, has received substantial international recognition. 
In the most recent 2015 PISA assessment, the country came only after Singapore and Japan in terms of the 
proficiency of 15-year-old students in science, reading and mathematics, while it has also become one of the 
world’s top performers when it comes to the inclusion and fairness of secondary education. More than four in 
ten Estonian students with a disadvantaged background score among the top quarter of students in all PISA 
participating countries despite the odds against them (OECD 2016). Khavenson & Carnoy (2016) argue that the 
Estonian long-term commitment to educational performance as an input for international competitiveness has 
allowed them to achieve such high rankings in international academic assessment exercises. Latvia was also one 
of the few countries which saw consistent improvements in their PISA scores from 2000, and its performance is 
at the level of the OECD average, along with the more developed economies such as the United States, Austria 
and Sweden. Lithuania, on the other hand, has lagged after the OECD average. Therefore, while the data 
presented in this section indicates that all three Baltic countries have devoted more policy effort to educational 
reform and expansion than this has been the case in Visegrad countries, Estonia has been a leader in this regard.  
 
Labour market policy 
A range of indicators presented in this section show greater generosity of labour market policy in Latvia and 
Lithuania in comparison to the Visegrad states, while this comparatively superior performance of the Baltic has 
been less pronounced in the case of Estonia. This finding may appear surprising at first glance, and also 
contradictory to the welfare state literature on Eastern Europe, which argues that the Visegrad countries have 
provided better protection for the unemployed than the Baltic ones. However, this discrepancy in narratives can 
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be explained by the fact that the Visegrad countries were more generous to those who were losing employment 
during the initial stages of transition. However, this policy of unemployment compensation and early retirement 
schemes, which was particularly prevalent in Hungary and Poland, generated serious fiscal pressures following 
which these policies had to be reformed (Vanhuysse 2009). As shown by the data presented in this section, this 
process was inverse in the Baltic, where labour market policy gradually became more generous over time. The 
higher levels of employment in the Baltic throughout transition have likely made the payment of benefits to 
jobseekers more fiscally sustainable than in Visegrad. This is also the reason why a cross-national comparison 
of labour market policy expenditures as a share of GDP would not be very informative, since the Baltic 
countries have had less unemployed persons to spend on than the Visegrad ones. 
The specific indicators are examined in the figures that follow. All three Baltic countries have been 
allocating around 20 per cent of their labour market policy expenditures to training while this category of 
expenditures has been almost non-existent in Visegrad countries (Figure 5). While there was a dip in 
expenditures on training during the period of economic recession, their share has recovered in Estonia and 
Latvia since, while it has continued to lag in Lithuania.  
< Figure 5 about here > 
Importantly, these expenditures in the Baltic have not come at the expense of unemployment 
compensation which guarantees income security to the unemployed. Coverage rates, i.e. the percentage of those 
insured for unemployment risk, have increased in all countries except in Hungary during the early 2000s (Figure 
6, left panel). They have also been the highest in the three Baltic countries and the Czech Republic throughout 
the period of observation. Furthermore, since the mid 1990s in Latvia and since the early 2000s in Lithuania and 
Estonia, net income replacement rates have substantially increased for the unemployed single individuals 
earning the average wage, while they slightly decreased in the Visegrad countries (Figure 6, right panel).  
< Figure 6 about here > 
Figure 7 offers further detail on net income replacement rates, and particularly their progressivity, by 
showing their levels for married individuals with two children and an unemployed spouse who were earning 
50% and 100% of the average wage at the time of unemployment. By focusing on these two categories of social 
security beneficiaries, we assess income replacement adequacy for those unemployed in the most precarious and 
vulnerable circumstances. Furthermore, these income replacement rates are obtained from the OECD Tax and 
Benefits Calculator which includes social assistance, family benefits, housing benefits that the person is eligible 
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for on top of the unemployment benefit, and thus offers a more comprehensive picture of the social security 
system in the countries of interest. 
Latvia and Lithuania, along with the Czech Republic, have the highest net income replacement rates for 
married with two children earning 50% of the average wage prior to loss of employment—around 100% (Figure 
7, left panel). While the replacement rate is substantially lower in Estonia, there has been a significant increase 
in the country since 2008, following which the country has reached the level of Hungary and Poland, and stood 
at 80% during the last year of observation, which was 2015. Slovakia has had the lowest income replacement 
rates throughout the period of observation. When it comes to those earning 50% of the average wage, Latvia and 
Lithuania have remained among the top performers, and Estonia has caught up with them following the 2008 
reform (Figure 7, right panel). 
< Figure 7 about here > 
Finally, when it comes to the duration of unemployment benefits, the Baltic countries have not been 
less stringent than the Visegrad countries, except for Poland, where the prescribed benefits’ payment period has 
been longer, but also decreasing over the years (Table 1). 
< Table 1 about here > 
Finally, Masso and Krillo (2011) show that expenditures on both passive and active measures in the 
Baltic countries have grown significantly since the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, also thanks to the use of 
EU funds which compensated for some of the fiscal constraints that the countries faced at the time. These 
observations indicate a strong response of labour market policy in the Baltic states to the adverse impact that the 
recession has had on the countries’ labour markets. 
 
Public sector employment  
Public sector employment trends in the two regions are also puzzling from the perspective of comparative 
welfare state and political economy literature on Eastern Europe. The figures below show that the ‘disembedded 
neoliberal’ Baltic countries, as the literature has refered to them, have had higher employment in public 
administration, education and health services than the ‘socially embedded’ Visegrad states.  
Figure 8 shows employment trends in the following parts of the public sector: i) public administration 
and defence, including compulsory social security, ii) education, and iii) health and social work. According to 
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the Eurostat classification, these are the knowledge-intensive public sector activities. Because of the variation in 
employment rates across the Eastern European countries analysed in this article, and following Gaddis and 
Klasen (2014), employees in the public sector are calculated as a share of the total working age population 
instead of a share in total employment. This is because two countries can have identical shares of employees in 
the public sector out of all employees, but when the overall employment rate is much lower in one country, that 
indicator hides the fact that a significantly lower portion of working age people work in the public sector in that 
country. Finally, public sector employees which work in state owned public companies are omitted from the 
analysis, also because of the significant variations in company privatisation levels across Eastern European 
countries.  
< Figure 8 about here > 
Public employment levels in the Baltic have risen steadily during the 2000s, and by 2008 the region 
had by far the highest share of public sector employment in Eastern Europe (Figure 9). The 2008 economic 
crisis had an adverse impact on the level of public employment in Latvia only, but the trend had recovered by 
2010 and continued going upward. The education sector has particularly driven the overall higher trends in 
public sector employment in the Baltic. Employment in the education sector as a share of total working age 
population was around 2pp higher in the Baltic countries than in Visegrad by the end of the period of 
observation (Figure 9).  
< Figure 9 about here > 
 Alternative explanations for the higher employment in the knowledge intensive parts of the public 
sector, that have little to do with social investment, could certainly be conceived. For example, the Baltic 
governments could have intended to reduce employment in these sectors, but trade unions could have resisted 
pressures for retrenchment. Likewise, more staff in the education sector could reflect the lower population 
density and thus smaller numbers of pupils per teacher in the more remote areas. Finally, due to population 
ageing, the number of school age children could have dropped in some of the observed countries, but not in 
others, which could explain the cross-country variation in educational workers as a share of the total working 
age population. 
Figure 10 (left panel) shows that trade union density, defined as the ratio of wage and salary earners 
that are trade union members divided by the total number of wage and salary earners, has not been higher in the 
Baltic than in Visegrad countries during the period of observation. It has in fact been lower in all three Baltic 
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republics, following the initial drops in trade union membership levels after the demise of socialism which took 
place across the board.  
< Figure 10 about here > 
While the teacher per pupil ratio in primary schools has been lower in the Baltic countries than in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, it has been higher in Estonia and Latvia than in Hungary and Poland, while 
Lithuania has been at the level of Hungary and Poland (Figure 10, right panel). There is therefore no direct 
correlation between employment levels in the educational sector and pupil density in primary schools. 
< Figure 11 about here > 
Finally, Figure 11 indicates that population ageing has taken place in both the Baltic and Visegrad 
countries. Between 1991 and 2017 the share of those aged 0-19 in total population has been reduced in all seven 
countries, and in 2017 it stood at exactly 20% in all of them (Figure 11). We can therefore conclude that the 
higher shares of employees in education sector in the Baltic vis-à-vis Visegrad are not due to the greater 
demographic need for education. 
 
Conclusions 
This article shows that, in comparison to the Visegrad countries, the Baltic countries have had higher 
expenditures on education, better educational attainment, higher levels of employment in public administration, 
education and health sectors, and at least as high social protection in case of unemployment. The article also 
shows that the Baltic countries, and most notably Estonia, have pursued a growth model which is geared 
towards ICT-led and knowledge-based competitiveness, which has not been limited to the IT sector but has had 
a wider effect in terms of the overall higher levels of digitalisation of the economy. 
Based on these empirical findings, the article argues that the Baltic countries have acquired some 
features of the Nordic model of ‘embedded liberalisation’ which is characterised by concurrent increases in 
labour market flexibility and generous labour market benefits along with investment in human capital and 
privatisation of public service delivery (Thelen, 2014). Although it is undisputable that the Baltic welfare states 
have been substantially weaker and less generous than the Nordic ones, this article focuses on comparing their 
trajectory of development to those found in the Visegrad countries, which have been at similar levels of 
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economic development, and which appear to have followed the Bismarckian tradition of welfare state reform, 
which is typical for countries such as Germany.  
While these are unexpected findings for the political economy literature on Eastern Europe, given its 
disembedded neoliberal interpretation of the Baltic transition, they are not surprising for the literature on social 
investment and the ‘new’ knowledge economy, which suggests that knowledge-based competitiveness needs 
public sector expenditures and services to underpin it, as most notably argued by Thelen (2014) and Mazzucato 
(2015). The article’s findings could also be used to challenge the economic account that the region’s successful 
educational and labour market performance can be attributed to the sound implementation of the Washington 
Consensus, which has put forward by Aslund (2013), but further analyses on the relationship between social 
investment policies and labour market outcomes would need to be conducted to that end. 
The argument that this article puts forward is also in line with the insight by Jensen (2011) that 
deindustrialisation is a key driver of public investment in education, and also that left-wing governments do 
not spend more on education than the right-wing ones. In fact, all three Baltic countries have had mostly right-
wing governments since the early 1990s. This observation indicates that, paradoxically, the right-wing Baltic 
governments have created more opportunities for the reskilling of large segments of the population and their 
greater labour market inclusion with better implications for the long-term security of the workforce than the 
Visegrad countries, which had more left-wing governments and implemented traditional welfare policies, such 
as passive cash compensation of the losers of transition. 
The revised account of welfare state development in the Baltic put forward in this article, however, 
does not intend to spread false optimism about the overall success of the Baltic transition. Its intent has been to 
expand the definition of the welfare state used in the political economy literature on Eastern Europe by 
including new social risks and showing that the Baltic states have fared comparatively better in this respect than 
the Visegrad countries. These conclusions are in line with findings from literature on social investment in 
advanced market economies which has suggested that some types of welfare state liberalisation trajectories have 
had more equalising effects for the population than the traditional Bismarckian welfare states (Morel et al. 2012; 
Thelen 2014). In that sense, the article uncovers what has been concealed in the previous narratives about the 
Baltic welfare states. Furthermore, the article does not claim that the Baltic growth models and their 
complementary welfare institutions have been or will be more sustainable than the Visegrad ones. Such a 
research question would require a separate analysis, which would include examining the implications of these 
countries’ dependencies on foreign capital on their long-term development.   
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Furthermore, while the micro analyses of social policy in the Baltic have emphasised differences 
between the three countries (Aidukaite 2006, 2013), which can also be teased out from the empirical section of 
this article, the analytical focus of this article has been on their similarities in order to juxtapose the Baltic 
trajectory against the Visegrad countries, in line with the political economy literature on the two regions. 
Therefore, while the article recognises that Estonia has done better in terms of innovation activities and 
education, and Latvia and Lithuania in terms of labour market protection policies, it also argues that a stylised 
Baltic trajectory of welfare state reform exists. An effort to provide cushioning for the growing labour market 
flexibilisation both via investment in human capital and increasingly generous unemployment benefits can be 
observed in all three countries. Furthermore, since the article’s focus is on welfare institutions and their 
similarities across the three cases and in opposition to Visegrad, it also does not engage with the issue of credit 
fuelled growth, which has certainly been more pronounced in Latvia than in Estonia, and which may explain 
some of the differences that can be observed between the countries. 
Finally, the article shows that educational and labour market policies and outcomes in the Baltic 
countries have generally been resilient to the impact of the 2008 economic crisis. While the three countries 
were severely impacted by the recession, and most notably Latvia and Lithuania, both in terms of their GDP 
decline and employment losses, empirical evidence has shown a pro-active labour market policy during the 
recession, following which their employment rates recovered to almost pre-crisis levels by 2010. The 
resilience of these policies during a severe recession indicates that they are not auxiliary strategies, but are in 
fact key pillars which have underpinned the region’s knowledge-intensive services oriented model of growth. 
Future studies could explore family policy as an additional component of this social investment policy 
package, to understand whether the Baltic countries have been evolving into more comprehensive social 
investment oriented welfare states. 
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Figure 3: Educational expenditures 
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Figure 5: Expenditures on labour market policies, composition 
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Figure 7: Income replacement rates for married with two children 
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Figure 8: Public sector employment 
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Figure 10: Trade union density and pupil/teacher ratio 
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